COLLINS ST

ASSET MANAGEMENT

Challenging the status quo

COLLINS ST

ASSET MANAGEMENT

September 2023 Quarterly Report

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AFSL: 468 935

COLLINS ST

ASSET MANAGEMENT

Our role is to help our investors grow their wealth for their families today and into the future.

We appreciate that our investors have spent a lifetime building their wealth and supporting their families, and we are passionate about helping support that effort to last for generations.

Collins St Asset Management is an independent, boutique, Melbourne based fund manager.

The business was established in 2015 by Michael Goldberg and Vasilios Piperoglou, with our flagship fund the Collins St Value Fund opening to investors in 2016. Each of our subsequent funds were established as the result of identifying a new opportunity as part of our ongoing research for the flagship fund.

Our objective is to provide a suite of funds that are best in breed in their categories.

Our funds manage money for a broad range of wholesale investors including superannuation funds, financial planning groups, charitable foundations, family offices, and individual investors.

- Founded in 2015
- $300 million in funds under management
- Offices in Melbourne, Sydney, and Gold Coast

Our Investment Philosophy

Patient
Objective
Value Investing

Hands on
In-depth
Primary research process

High
Conviction
Portfolio
Construction

Align interests with investors

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ASSET MANAGEMENT

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COLLINS ST ASSET MANAGEMENT

LAUNCHED FUNDS

COLLINS ST VALUE FUND

A high conviction portfolio of our most compelling Australian listed ideas.

Not benchmarked against any index, the Fund simply seeks to generate an absolute positive return over the medium term.

The fund has no fixed management fees. The only fee is performance based.

Since inception in 2016, the Fund has generated net returns of 13.36% p.a.

COLLINS ST CONVERTIBLE NOTES

A portfolio of convertible notes primarily in Australian listed companies.

Loans secured against the assets of the company, with potential upside from an option to convert the debt to equity.

Targeted 8% p.a distribution (net of fees)

Launched in 2022

COLLINS ST SPECIAL SITUATION 1

A concentrated portfolio of internationally listed offshore oil services companies.

Seeking to take advantage of the dysfunction in the Traditional energy space, and particularly in the services sector.

A closed ended fund launched in 2021 to be wound up approximately 3 years after launch

Net return since inception: >95%

CSAM GPI FUND

GPI is a business that primarily provides consumables for the smash repair industry.

GPI also owns businesses in corporate merchandising and consumer sports goods.

The fund is a 4 year closed ended fund, with the business to be ultimately sold to industry participants or listed via an IPO.

Launched in 2022

COLLINS ST SPECIAL SITUATION 2

A portfolio of listed Australian and international gold companies.

Seeking to benefit from both the high levels of inflation and negative real interest rates.

A closed ended fund launched in 2023 and expected to be wound up within 3 years.

Zero ongoing management fee.

FUND SUMMARY

Welcome to our Q3 2024 investor letter.

In the following pages we will provide readers with some insight into our thinking and challenges faced by investors. Specifically, we share our thoughts about deep value and contrarian investing and highlight some common emotional biases that drive investor behaviour and generate pricing dislocations that can be exploited over time.

An overview of key developments for each of our funds is provided below. More detailed commentary is provided in the dedicated quarterly reports.

The Value Fund: The value fund generated a total return of 8.22% against the index which returned -0.75% this quarter. For the past 12 months, the fund has generated a total return of 11.34%. Most pleasingly the performance was driven by a number of stocks that we have long believed were fundamentally strong yet have been undervalued by markets. The best performers included National Tyre & Wheel (up 40%), Litigation Capital Management (up 24%) and Carnarvon (up 23%).

Special Situations No.1: The offshore oil and gas services fund generated an 18% return for the September quarter. Having originally raised capital 2 years ago, we have subsequently returned almost 120% of the original capital. As at the writing of this update, there remains almost 75% of our original capital available within the fund (portfolio value of approx. $30m against an original raise of $39m).

Special Situations No.2: The global gold and precious metals fund has performed as expected. Markets for gold stocks have been weak since launch, with our fund being down as much as 20% at one point. Nevertheless, we are excited about the prospects of our holdings and note that at the writing of this update our holdings are down by about 6% (from launch). We have high expectations for the sector, and are excited to see how it performs over the next few years.

Due to continued interest from investors, the fund will temporarily re-open during November. If you would like to invest, please reach out to Rob Hay at your soonest convenience.

Convertible Notes Fund: The fund has been performing as outlined in our recent updates. The three remaining holdings within the portfolio continue to show promise while the wind-up process of AHQ remains ongoing. In this quarter's report we re-visit each of the remaining holdings, providing a summary of their terms and our expectations.

GPI Fund: The investment in GPI group has been performing well. The business is on track to meet budget, generate growth and take advantage of newly implemented efficiencies. The divisions have each been winning new clients, and have seen some former clients return – and increase their contracts.

Bias in investing

Understanding the Impact of Bias

Since the early days of behavioural economics (born in the late 1960's), much has been made of the evolution of our understanding of investor behaviour.

While once it was believed that investors always make rational decisions based on all the information available, leading thinkers like Daniel Kahneman in his work with Amos Twersky identified many heuristics (mental shortcuts) that people use on a daily basis, which can drastically effect decision making. These decision-making outcomes are often predictable, but it's only with the benefit of hindsight that the perpetrator of those decisions recognises their error.

We've previously discussed examples of mental heuristics and their impact on decision making. Revisiting and expanding our understanding of this key area, is (and must continue to be) an ongoing endeavour.

Take a moment to consider the following questions. Try to answer these questions out loud as quickly as you can - answers are available at the bottom of page 8:

> *1). There are water lilies on a lake. Each day, the amount of water lilies doubles. After 20 days there are so many water lilies that the entire lake is covered. After how many days was half of the lake covered?*
>
> *2). A racket and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The racket costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?*
>
> *3). There are two hospitals in a city, a small and a big one. In which of them is the likelihood higher of substantially more boys than girls being born in one day? (Provided that girls and boys are on average born equally frequently)*
>
> > *a) The big hospital*
> >
> > *b) The small hospital*
> >
> > *c) The chances are equal for both*
>
> *4). Five machines produce five plates in five hours. How much time do three machines need for three plates?*

For those who didn't get all the above questions correct, don't be too hard on yourself. The questions are specifically designed to illustrate how our minds will fight our better senses and insist on relying on our natural intuition rather than engage in the 'deep thinking' part of our brains.

Some of the pitfalls discussed by behavioural economics that are common include:

Herding: Following the crowd. It describes the tendency to feel comforted by the knowledge that other investors share your enthusiasm in a particular sector or company. It explains why social media and chat groups can have such a profound impact on investment decision making.

Anchoring: Describes the behaviour of an investor that is slow to react to new information. The investor in 'anchored' to their previous ideas and unwilling to shift their view despite new data suggesting a change in circumstances. Anchoring is sometimes manifest when an investor who has fallen in love with a stock is unable to sell when the share price is below their purchase (or initial valuation) price. The same can occur for buyers of stock, who psychologically struggle with making a



purchase decision when a share price has moved slightly above the point at which the buyer first thought to buy.

Recency Bias: A situation where investors assume that what happened today and yesterday will continue to happen into the future. This challenge sees otherwise sensible individuals disregard the evidence of decades (or generations) and simply assume that what is currently occurring will continue to occur into the future. This psychological phenomena is often the cause of the greatest periods of volatility in markets. When markets and the economy are strong, investors are willing to price companies to unreasonable heights (think the 'buy-now-pay-later sector which was trading on multiples of prospective revenue rather than a profit multiple), or crushing lows (when markets are weak and investors can't see past the near term pessimism, companies trade at unreasonably low multiples).

Loss Aversion: A concept that measures the difference between the pleasure of success against the pain of failure. Studies have shown that it is somewhat common for investors to weigh the pain of a $1 loss as 2.5 times more 'heavy' than the satisfaction of a $1 gain.

All of these factors are understandable, and there are certainly tools available to us all to manage and limit their impact on our decision making. However as always, the first step in correcting a problem is recognising that one exists – and that's not easy.

It's beyond the scope of this letter to resolve personal investment and psychological challenges, but two tools that we often use within the office include:

1. Think about the problem overnight. It's extremely rare that a decision needs to be made in haste, and if you think that a matter in front of you is one of those rare occasions, take the night to consider it to be sure.
2. Find an investment buddy. Have someone that you can discuss your ideas with. A compatriot who is both interested in investing, and willing to challenge your ideas.

Those two concepts will save most investors from most of their terrible decisions.

Investor behaviour in uncertain times:

Risk vs Uncertainty.

In the short to medium term, markets are driven by an unholy combination of investor sentiment and fundamental analysis. The more at peace the world feels, the more weight is given to fundamentals, whereas when uncertainty prevails it's sentiment that drives prices.

So significant is the impact of market uncertainty that a quick google search of research on the topic will generate about 237,000,000 results.



In the current environment uncertainty has certainly been the driving factor for markets. A quick assessment of the last couple of years and we have had a global health pandemic, massive unprecedented stimulus packages, the first war in Europe in 30 years, threats from an ever-emerging China, and a global inflation (and debt) problem that no one seems to have a good solution for.

Yet, it's important to note that when it comes to investing, uncertainty is not the same as risk.

Uncertainty is a driver of sentiment, it creates angst and ecstasy, influencing decision making in a way that is unhealthy for the investor's returns. It is unknowable, and by definition is unmeasurable. Uncertainty fills the pages of newspapers and takes up time on TV talk shows. It is the driver of 'animal spirits' and bears little influence on the **long-term** outcomes of investing.

Risk on the other hand is identifiable and measurable.

Measuring risk: When rolling dice or spinning a roulette wheel, players understand that they have a 1 in 6 (or 1 in 38) chance of rolling a particular number. There is no certainty that the player will roll the number they want, nor is there a guarantee that 6 spins will guarantee their outcome, but the odds are measurable and understandable. Similarly, when investing, investors can gauge a company's earnings, and based on all the information available, they can make a reasonable assessment of the business's likely future prospects.

Measuring uncertainty: Measuring uncertainty is almost impossible. Whereas the above illustration gives a practical application of measuring risk, the measure of uncertainty would be like trying to assess the chances of the dice landing on a point, or being snatched away by a cowboy riding a horse before the player has a chance to see the outcome. There is no actuarial procedure that can account for horse riding cowboys snatching dice.

But unimaginable events do occur. They occur all too often. Weather events see insurance companies who take otherwise sensible bets on likely disasters hit by unprecedented events leading to heavy payouts. Terrorist attacks, wars, and global pandemics have all occurred over time, each time opening investors eyes to the possibility of the 'impossible', each time driving investor sentiment and share prices lower.

Investors often make the mistake of falling into the trap of recency bias (as described above). When unexpected events have recently occurred, investors cannot see beyond the ambiguity of the current status. During these times, investors are unreasonably pessimistic about the outlook for stocks. Good news and bad news are not weighted equally (as they should be). Instead, studies have shown that in times of high uncertainty markets and investors seem to (at the extreme) totally disregard any positive news, while simultaneously giving undue weight to risks or actual bad news.

This psychology is apparent in good times as well, but the impact on investor behaviour is less stark in the good times as compared to poor times.

In their book Ambiguity and Investor Behaviour, Steffen Meyer and Charline Uhr assess investor appetite to ambiguity (uncertainty) and its impact on their investing behaviour. They found that almost 60% of investors are ambiguity averse, while only (almost) 30% sought out ambiguity. The impact of these positions was that ambiguity averse investors were likely to drastically increase the rate of their trading – exiting positions they viewed as risky during periods of uncertainty, Ambiguity seeking investors would also increase their trading activity - buying stocks they view as opportunistically priced. The net impact on markets from all that activity is significantly to the downside as uncertainty leads to selling which leads to more uncertainty (and a self sustaining cycle is created).

When I first sat down to write this article I had thought to make the case that value investors ought to disregard the concept of uncertainty/

ambiguity in markets. I had expected to make the case that it is precisely the ambiguity in markets that provides the opportunities we fundamental value investors look for. And fundamentally I do believe that to be true. I truly do believe that ultimately the price of a share will reflect the value of its cash flows over time. I do believe that critically considering an investment is the only way to understand its value and gain the conviction needed to make and maintain an investment.

However, I think it's equally important to recognise where my bias lies. Our team are a unique bunch. We love digging up ideas in unexpected places and view ourselves very much as contrarians. I have no doubt that if Meyer and Uhr had interviewed the team at Collins St, we would have fallen very much in the minority (ambiguity seekers).

It's unreasonable to expect all investors to be comfortable in the same spaces as we are.

There is a cohort of investors (probably the majority of individual investors) that can't help but follow their gut. They sell when markets are uncertain and fall, creating selling pressure on top of selling pressure, locking in losses, and buy only where there is 'clarity' in markets, long after the rallies have played out. It's unsurprising then to note that studies have shown that most active non-professional investors significantly underperform the shares or managed funds they invest in.

The challenge they face is that it is precisely at those times where it feels most uncomfortable to invest (when uncertainty is at its higher) that the greatest opportunity lies just around the corner – this is especially true given how quickly markets can move and how much of long-term gains are actually realised during relatively short periods of time.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the impact that uncertainty can have on markets. This is especially true when making investments based on near-term expectations. Our preference at Collins St is certainly to invest in good quality companies for the long term, but we do occasionally invest in special situations with near term expectations. Those special situation investments (like takeover arbitrage – Crown, Link, iCarAsia, Billabong and others) have performed positively in all but one occasion (Link). At each opportunity we assessed the risk, measured it against the benefit, and made a decision. It wasn't the risk that got us with our one loss (LNK), it was the unexpected, the left field (a combination of a COVID environment and an overly ambitious regulator).

Our Key Takeaway:

Both Risk and Ambiguity are factors that ought to be considered when investing in shares.

The problem for fundamental and value investors is that Ambiguity is impossible to measure, and being concerned with quantitative inputs as a core part of our valuation process, not being able to measure something can cause some angst.

Thankfully, the impact of ambiguity on markets appears to be 'relatively' short term. The longer an investment holding period is intended, the more the impact of risk and the less the impact of uncertainty.

This ought to give some comfort to value investors about the prospects of their deep value holdings in the current market, and the prospects for their outperformance in the medium term… if only we can overcome war, a pandemic, cultural rift, and inflation.

If you have any questions about this quarterly report please reach out to our Head of Investor Relations Rob Hay on 03 9602 1230 or via email at rhay@csvf.com.au

Answers to the riddles:

1) 19 days. 2) $1.05 for the bat plus 5c for the ball. 3) b: The smaller hospital is more likely to experience outlier events due to its small sample size. 4) 5 hours.

Recent reading related to this topic:

"The Psychology of Preferences", Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. "How Do Investors React Under Uncertainty", Ron Bird & Danny Yeung (University of Technology, Sydney). "Rational Investing in an Age of Uncertainty", Harlan Levinson (Morgan Stanley). "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman (Journal of Science). "The Impact of Uncertainty on Investor Behaviour", Larry Swedroe.


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CHAMBERS

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Unit Price:

Buy Price	Unit Price	Sell Price
$1.8933	$1.8839	$1.8745

Holdings*

Beach Energy
Boom Logistics
Carnarvon Energy
Gold Basket of stocks
Humm Group
Link Administration Group
Litigation Capital Management
MMA Offshore
National Tyre & Wheel
Retail Food Group
RPM Automotive Group
Seven West Media Group

* In the interests of investors, the Fund does not disclose all its positions.

Performance (to 30 September 2023)*

Period	Return
September Quarter 2023	8.22%
12 months	11.34%
2 years (annualised)	-2.39%
3 years (annualised)	13.71%
5 years (annualised)	14.55%
Annualised Return (since inception)	13.36%

*Net returns. Assuming reinvestment of distributions.



The September quarter sure did throw up some volatility for investors. From peak to trough, the ASX200 moved up by as much as almost 7% in July, before giving back all of those gains for a final Q3 loss of 0.77%.

Pleasingly the Collins St Value Fund performed significantly better during the quarter, recording an 8.22% return for investors.



In this edition of the Collins St Value Fund quarterly report we consider the cost of long term outperformance and revisit some of our longer term holdings. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to reach out to Rob Hay on 0423 345 975 or via email at rhay@csvf.com.au

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"… the general public is generally wrong. The masses are not well informed about investments… They are moved mainly by their emotions, and history has proven them to be wrong consistently "

- Claude Rosenberg Jr

In the introductory investor letter, we discussed some of the potential impacts of bias in investment, and particularly, the impact of uncertainty in the market and the volatility it can create.

Uncertainty's impact on markets:

Over the last 18 months, we've seen a significant increase in investor focus on uncertainty and angst. Driven by the outbreak of war on two continents, a weakening global economy, a debt burden that continues to grow, and inflation concerns as well as increasing interest rates both locally and throughout most of the developed world, investors have been shifting capital en-masse from solid small and mid-cap companies and seeking 'safety' in the largest listed companies.

So dramatic has this flow of capital been that we haven't seen so great a disparity between valuations for large cap stocks and smaller cap stocks since the dot-com boom and bust in 2000.

Small Cap / Large Cap Relative Valuation
Median LTM P/E Russell 2000/S&P 500 (Only Profitable Companies)

Despite the fact that many of the smaller companies have been sold down irrespective of their relative safety and stable cash flows, or the fact that many large companies have dubious financial strength, markets have continued to sell smaller businesses in pursuit of investment into larger alternatives.

Driven by continuing uncertainty in the economic outlook, this shift has created some significant volatility across equity markets, especially in the small and mid cap space.

We have viewed this dislocation in price/value in small and medium sized companies as an opportunity worth exploiting. It's created a scenario where good quality industrial companies are trading at low single digit Price to Earnings multiples (compared to market averages in the mid teens). Companies like Retail Food Group (PE of 5), National Tyre & Wheel (PE of 6), and Carnarvon Energy (at a discount to sale proceeds and cash backing).

But buying out of favour companies isn't a 'comfortable' position to be in. The moment you announce your stake in an unpopular idea, your peers think you're crazy. Even when results turn your way, a contrarian investor will simply be told that they got lucky!

But it's precisely the discomfort associated with investing in these sorts of ideas and the hard work undertaken to gain conviction that provides the avenue to opportunity.

The challenge for investors is to gain the insight and conviction in these quality businesses even as markets insist that you are mad.

"Sometimes stocks are cheap for a reason. It's an investor's job to find overstated pessimism and to test their view using primary evidence."

- Collins St Asset Management

Our view is that it's the effort and willingness to be uncomfortable that the world doesn't see that generates the outcomes that the world does see (and is envious of).

Without the hard work and sacrifice there couldn't be success

In much the same way one doesn't become a champion sportsman without an 'unreasonable' amount of effort, one can't become a successful investor without a willingness to pay the price - investing in unpopular areas, and experiencing a higher degree of volatility.

Like the sweat and tears of the athlete, these are the cost of long term investment outperformance.

Two of our current holdings:

CARNARVON ENERGY LTD Canarvon (ASX:CVN): *Market cap $250 million*

The Discomfort: *Investing in a non-producing oil company, whose production timeline is dictated by a 3rd party.*



CVN is a relatively small energy company with its main assets off the coast of WA. Their major project is a joint venture with Santos on a project named Dorado.

The prospect is very much a tier one asset, being located in a mining friendly region (WA) and having a huge resource. As of CVN's latest reporting the Dorado project is said to consist of approximately 160 million barrels of oil. Translated to a measurement that most readers would be more familiar with, that equates to approximately 25.5 Billion litres of oil.

A massive project.

One of the key challenges for CVN has been that Santos have been distracted by another mega project based in Canada. Nevertheless, recent activity (including the procurement of all primary approvals - the latest being an environmental approval achieved in February) suggests that Santos are re-focusing on the Bedout Basin.

“Everyone wants to be a beast until it comes time to do what beasts do”

Early indications are that Santos expect to ramp up production to 100,000 barrels per day, and during that ramp up period Carnarvon have identified other assets in the area that can make use of the infrustructure until Dorado is at full tilt.

The challenge for CVN is that a project of this scope comes at a huge capital cost, and because of that markets have been concerned about their ability to fund their 20% share. Recognising this challenge, management have sold half their exposure in the project to an operational partner named CPC Corporation (Taiwan). On the basis of the terms of that deal we estimate that CVN should have been trading at around 32c. Despite the deal and the attractiveness of CVN’s assets, the share price has languished at just 15c.

What's it worth?

Recent analyst reports have suggested that the value of CVN’s projects (on an un-risked basis) is circa $800 million. On top of that, the company currently has approximately $180 million in cash or ~$320 in liquidity once the sale of half their stake in Dorado is settled.

Simply considering the cash the company currently holds combined with the cash its about to receive, and CVN has cash backing of almost 18c per share.

It seems to us that CVN is unreasonably cheap. Given the nature of its industry and the consolidation and recent corporate activity we’ve been seeing, we wouldn't be surprised if one of CVN’s larger peers thought the same.

MMA OFFSHORE

MMA Offshore: (ASX:MRM) *Market cap ~$500 million*

The Discomfort: *<u>conviction in the continued turn around of the offshore energy sector, and a company whose share price had fallen over 90%</u>*.

MMA Offshore provides a comprehensive suite of marine and subsea services to the offshore energy sector.

Historically, MRM have generated the bulk of their revenues from offshore oil & gas projects and as such their fortunes have been driven by demand and investment in new offshore oil projects. As a result it’s not surprising to see that as the offshore oil & gas markets turned in 2013, MRM’s fortunes turned as well - the MRM share price fell from $24 to 24c between 2013 and 2021.

A cultural shift away from fossil fuels coupled with no appetite for spending in traditional fuel projects saw a chronic underinvestment in the sector, and a precipitous collapse for any business relying on the industry.

Yet in 2021 we began to see an increase in demand for oil rigs as utilisation rates increased from historic lows of near 40%, with many companies beginning to report an expected return to >80% in the coming year. Additionally, we began to see that a pinch in the availability of good quality essential assets saw prices almost double for access to those assets.

It would take an investor with a high degree of confidence in their research and a general disregard for volatility to have watched a share fall over 90% in the proceeding years and still invest in MRM, yet that’s precisely what Collins St Value Fund did.



"Buy on cannons sell on trumpets"

- French Proverb

At an average price of approximately 33c per share, we were comfortable that the prospects for MRM were bright, and that despite the volatility the sector had experienced, buying the stock at just 30% of its Net Tangible Asset Backing (the price at which the company believes the assets could be sold), was the sound investment decision.

Pleasingly the industry continued to improve in the months and years since we bought in.

The tailwinds for MRM have been two fold: the oil & gas sector has experienced a revival, and as nations realise the transition to renewables is more complex than anticipated, more funding is flowing towards offshore wind farms - an area that already represents 20% of MRM's revenues, and a sector with huge growth potential.

As value investors our job is always to assess the potential benefits of an investment against the risk. Our investment in MRM was a reflection of its discount to the value of the sale of its assets, a discount we believed would be bridged as the industry continued to improve. That improvement has been realised, and the NTA gap has been closed.

Looking forward the company has bright prospects, in particular thanks to its exposure to renewables. However, given our commitment to investing in just our favourite risk adjusted positions, we have materially reduced our exposure to reflect the increased risk (driven by higher prices).



Our view of the investing world is that to succeed one needs to get comfortable being uncomfortable. To outperform the markets, an investor needs to have a deep degree of conviction in his ideas - in particular he must have conviction in ideas in which the majority of the investment world disagrees. Additionally, the investor must have the confidence (and stomach) to sustain that confidence through volatility.

This approach isn't for everyone, and many famous investors (including value investor extraordinaire - Warren Buffett) have suggested that most people would be better off investing in an index fund. And, (as is the case for most people) if investors can't spend the time to gain sufficient conviction, or stomach the cost in volatility, we would agree.

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VALUE FUND

KEY FEATURES

Fund Name:	Collins St Value Fund ABN 72 216 927 242
Trustee:	Collins St Asset Management Pty Ltd ACN 601 897 974 AFSL 468935
Custodian:	Sandhurst Trustees Limited
Registry/Unit Pricing:	Apex Fund Services (Australia) Pty Ltd
Auditors:	Pitcher Partners
Fund Inception Date:	Feb 2016
Investment Objective:	The Fund seeks to create investment returns over the medium to long term.
Investment Strategy:	The Fund invests in a concentrated portfolio of Australian securities. It focuses on identifying deep value investment opportunities. This is achieved by identifying sustainable businesses trading at a discount to our assessment of intrinsic value.
Benchmark:	Index Unaware
Asset Class:	Long only ASX company securities & Cash (no derivatives).
Leverage:	None
Minimum Subscription:	$250,000 (unless otherwise agreed) and only open to investors considered "wholesale investors" as defined by the Corporations Act.
Investment Term:	There is no fixed investment term. Investors may apply to acquire Units in the Fund at any time the Fund is open for investment. Investors may redeem Units subject to the applicable liquidity and redemption policy.
Distribution Frequency:	Annually
Entry Fee:	Nil
Buy/Sell Spread:	0.50%
Applications:	Monthly
Management Fee:	Nil
Performance Fee above Hurdle Rate:	25% (Hurdle rate is the 10 year Aus Gov't Bond Rate)
High Water Mark	Yes
Platform Availability	IDPS (sophisticated investors only) platform of: Netwealth, Hub24, Mason Stevens and Power Wrap

For more information about the Fund please obtain a copy of the Information Memorandum which is available upon request.

KEY DATA

AFM ADVANCED ANALYTICS	Collins St Value Fund: Feb 2016 - Sep 2023 Index: ASX200 Total Return						
Annual Returns and Analytics	**1 year**	**2 years**	**3 years**	**4 years**	**5 years**	**7 years**	**Since Inception**
Fund Annual Return per annum	11.33%	-2.39%	13.70%	12.73%	14.54%	14.23%	13.33%
Index Annual Return per annum	13.46%	2.34%	11.00%	5.27%	6.67%	9.45%	8.98%
Fund Cumulative Return (on $100)	$111.33	$95.27	$146.98	$161.50	$197.11	$222.19	$261.01
Index Cumulative Return (on $100)	$113.46	$104.74	$136.75	$122.79	$138.09	$171.93	$193.33
Monthly Returns and Analytics	**1 year**	**2 years**	**3 years**	**4 years**	**5 years**	**7 years**	**Since Inception**
Fund Average monthly return	0.90%	-0.20%	1.08%	1.00%	1.14%	1.12%	1.18%
Index Average monthly return	1.06%	0.19%	0.87%	0.43%	0.54%	0.76%	0.81%
Fund % of Positive Months	67%	63%	72%	71%	72%	73%	74%
Index % of Positive Months	50%	46%	61%	60%	62%	63%	63%
Fund Average +ve Return	2.48%	2.52%	3.24%	4.00%	4.10%	3.43%	3.35%
Index Average +ve Return	4.22%	4.00%	3.33%	3.47%	3.34%	2.97%	3.03%
Fund Best Month	6.49%	6.49%	10.77%	12.87%	12.87%	12.87%	12.87%
Index Best Month	6.58%	6.89%	10.21%	10.21%	10.21%	10.21%	10.21%
Fund Average -ve Return	-2.84%	-5.04%	-4.65%	-6.11%	-6.08%	-5.33%	-5.18%
Index Average -ve Return	-1.98%	-2.87%	-2.80%	-3.88%	-3.67%	-3.08%	-2.98%
Performance in Positive Markets	**1 year**	**2 years**	**3 years**	**4 years**	**5 years**	**7 years**	**Since Inception**
Number of months market was positive	6	11	22	29	37	53	58
Fund % positive months, when market positive	100%	91%	91%	90%	86%	83%	84%
Cumulative Fund return in positive market	18.73%	33.68%	92.97%	188.74%	252.75%	274.68%	320.02%
Cumulative Index return in positive market	28.01%	53.64%	104.38%	166.76%	234.83%	366.97%	456.59%
Up Capture Ratio	66.85%	62.78%	89.07%	113.18%	107.63%	74.85%	70.09%
Performance in Negative Markets	**1 year**	**2 years**	**3 years**	**4 years**	**5 years**	**7 years**	**Since Inception**
Number of months market was negative	6	13	14	19	23	31	34
Fund % positive months, when market negative	50%	46%	50%	47%	52%	58%	59%
Cumulative Fund return in negative market	-6.23%	-28.73%	-23.83%	-44.07%	-44.12%	-40.70%	-37.86%
Cumulative Index return in negative market	-11.37%	-31.83%	-33.09%	-53.97%	-58.76%	-63.18%	-65.26%
Down Capture Ratio	54.83%	90.26%	72.03%	81.65%	75.09%	64.42%	58.01%

Data sourced from Australian Fund Monitors. https://www.fundmonitors.com